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Casenote

Can We Keep a Secret?: The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in the
Internal Law-Firm Setting-St. Simons
Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean,
Exley & Dunn, PC.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recognized at common law, the attorney-client privilege is often
invoked for the purpose of fostering honest and fruitful communication
between attorneys and their clients.' In St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v.
Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P C.,2 the Georgia Supreme Court
ruled on an issue regarding the reach of this privilege that had never
before been addressed in Georgia courts. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC
(SSW) asked the court to determine the applicability of the attorneyclient privilege and work-product doctrine to communication between
attorneys at Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. (Hunter Maclean)
and its in-house general counsel.' The court held that the same rules

1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
2. 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013).
3. Id. at 419, 422, 746 S.E.2d at 102, 104.
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and analysis considered in determining the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine for the normative attorney-client relationship
apply when addressing their applicability in the law-firm in-house
counsel setting.' Accordingly, the court held that the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct' do not govern the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine in this unique relationship and that no fiduciary
exception can trump these privileges in the state of Georgia.6 Only a
day prior to this decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court issued a
similar holding regarding this intra-firm communication issue.' The
Georgia Supreme Court's ruling has caught the attention of the press
and the American Bar Association, providing opinions on the court's
decisions and speculating what will result from such a ruling.8 This
approach for analyzing a seldom-addressed issue' could prove most
favorable for firms handling adversarial clients. The only trouble could
be determining at what point the attorney-client relationship is
established for the purpose of the privilege.

4. Id. at 419, 746 S.E.2d at 102. Chief Justice Hunstein, who wrote the opinion of the
court, explained that the court must use the same rules that govern the work-product
doctrine in any other attorney-client relationship in determining its applicability to the
relationship between attorneys and in-house counsel. Id. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
Furthermore, Justice Hunstein reasoned that the work-product doctrine will attach, just
like the attorney-client privilege, once the attorney-client relationship becomes adversarial.
Id. at 430, 746 S.E.2d at 109.
5.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013).

6. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 419-20, 429, 746 S.E.2d at 102, 108.
7. RFF Family P'ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1068, 1078-81
(Mass. 2013) (holding that communications between attorneys and in-house counsel are
protected by the attorney-client privilege if: (1) the law firm designated a firm attorney to
act as in-house counsel; (2) the in-house counsel remained separate from the client matter
or "a substantially related matter"; (3) there is no billing to the client for the time spent
with the in-house counsel; and (4) the communications were confidential, and also holding
that the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit the extension of the
attorney-client privilege over communications between attorneys and in-house counsel if
these four conditions are met); Alyson M. Palmer, Lawyers' Talks with Law Firm GC May
Be Shielded, DAILY REP., July 12, 2013, at 1-2 (stating that the Georgia Supreme Court
would have been the first appellate court of last resort to rule on the "scope of the attorneyclient privilege for firm in-house counsel" if the Massachusetts court did not rule on the
issue the day before).
8. See generally Mark Curriden, Inside Story: A Georgia Case Focuses on the Extent to
Which Communications Between Lawyers and a Firm's In-House Counsel Should Be
Protected, A.B.A. J., May 2013, at 22-23; Palmer, supra note 7.
9. Mark J. Fucile, The Double Edged Sword: Internal Law Firm Privilege and the
"FiduciaryException," 76 DEF. COUNs. J. 313, 315 (2009) ("The number of courts that have
addressed this issue to date remains relatively small.").

2014]

ATTORNEY- CLIENT PRIVILEGE
II.

561

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2006, SSW hired Hunter Maclean to assist with the development
and sale of high-end condominiums on St. Simons Island, Georgia.
Hunter Maclean attorneys were responsible for drafting the form
purchase contracts for presale of the condominiums." When the real
estate market declined in late 2007, buyers in southern Georgia began
opting out of their contracts,n with some, including SSW's condominium buyers, claiming problems with the contracts.12 SSW sought advice
from attorneys at Hunter Maclean about the likelihood of a court
granting specific performance of the contracts, but members of the firm's
litigation team advised SSW that specific performance was unlikely and
began reviewing buyers' claims at the request of the primary attorneys
for SSW"3
On February 18, 2008, two of the primary attorneys and a member of
the litigation team engaged in a conference call with two SSW representatives to discuss settling with the buyers. According to Hunter
Maclean, one attorney began discussing the settling process and the
claims to the representatives when the president of SSW joined the
conversation in an angry fashion. The attorneys thought the statements
by the president meant that SSW would bring suit against Hunter
Maclean; however, one of SSW's representatives and its president
testified that there was no intention to sue at that point. Instead, they
claimed that the president joined the conversation to inform the
attorneys that he was not interested in settling. One of the attorneys
testified that she determined around this time that Hunter Maclean
should withdraw from representing SSW Additionally, she testified that
she informed the client of the need to seek outside counsel a few days
prior to and during the conference call."
After this conference call, the attorneys sought advice from the firm's
in-house counsel regarding potential claims SSW might have against the
firm. Hunter Maclean's in-house counsel interviewed the attorneys and
sought assistance from outside counsel. The firm's in-house counsel was
not involved with Hunter Maclean's representation of SSW Hunter
Maclean continued to represent SSW in closings and negotiations with

10. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 98.
11. Curriden, supra note 8, at 22.
12. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
13. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 317 Ga. App.
1, 2, 730 S.E.2d 608, 612 (2012) (indicating that there was a specific-performance provision
in the pre-sale purchase form contracts drafted by Hunter Maclean).
14. Id. at 3, 6, 730 S.E.2d at 612, 614-15.
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buyers while the firm sought new counsel for their client.'5 The
attorneys helped prepare defenses for potential claims with the in-house
counsel during the firm's continued representation of SSW." Additionally, one Hunter Maclean attorney represented SSW in negotiations with
buyers while assisting in-house counsel in the "internal investigation/defense efforts, acting as in-house counsel.""
Sometime around the February 2008 conference call, Hunter Maclean
attorneys started drafting a letter to SSW regarding the rescinding
buyers' individual claims and advice on how to deal with these claims.
Despite SSW's request for this letter, the firm's in-house counsel advised
Hunter Maclean "to stop drafting it after he perceived that SSW was
adverse to the firm." Consequently, the letter was never completed or
sent to SSW.s In 2009, SSW retained the services of a new firm and
filed a complaint against Hunter Maclean alleging legal malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.19
A dispute arose between Hunter Maclean and SSW during the
discovery phase of the lawsuit. SSW demanded documents and
depositions from Hunter Maclean attorneys, its outside counsel, and its
in-house counsel. In response, Hunter Maclean filed motions for
protective orders and to quash the subpoenas for depositions, asserting
the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. SSW filed
a motion to compel discovery, specifically to retrieve communication
between Hunter Maclean attorneys and outside counsel and the firm's
communication with in-house counsel. 21 SSW argued that the in-house
counsel's advice to the attorneys constituted a breach of a fiduciary duty
by Hunter Maclean, which went "to the heart of SSW's claims."21
Furthermore, SSW claimed to be "entitled to the information" because

15. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
16. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 5, 730 S.E.2d at 613.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6, 730 S.E.2d at 614.
19. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102 (indicating that the
fraud claim was for Hunter Maclean's representation of SSW involving the condominiums
and its conduct once the firm's interest became adverse); Hunter,Maclean, Exley & Dunn,
P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 7, 730 S.E.2d at 615 (indicating that the legal malpractice claim was
for a failure to properly advise SSW on the requirements of O.C.G.A. §§ 44-3-70 to -117
(2011) (Georgia Condominium Act), its drafting of contracts, and its representation of SSW
when buyers began to rescind on the contracts).
20. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 8, 730 S.E.2d at 615-16
(stating that Hunter Maclean's privilege log identified twenty-one documents created after
the February 18, 2008 conference call).
21. Id. at 8, 730 S.E.2d at 616.
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the communication occurred during Hunter Maclean's representation of
SSW22

The Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia granted SSW's
motion to compel communication between the firm's attorneys and inhouse counsel, holding that any privilege pertaining to this relationship
was "abrogated" because of a conflict of interest between the firm and
the client.23 The court reasoned that the Georgia Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.1024 applied to the firm's in-house counsel because he was
a partner at the firm.2 5
The Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the
case for the trial court to apply a new standard of analysis.26 On
interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered other
jurisdictions' approaches for analyzing the applicability of the privilege
to law-firm in-house counsel. 27 The court of appeals determined that
the proper standard for analyzing the privilege's extension to communication between attorneys and the firm's in-house counsel turned on
whether there was a conflict of interest between the in-house counsel's
duty to the law firm and his duty to the client." Furthermore, the
court noted that the attorney-client privilege protects communications

22. Id.
23. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420-21, 746 S.E.2d at 103. Furthermore,
the superior court held that there was a conflict of interest because Hunter Maclean failed
to inform SSW of the conflict and prepared defenses against SSW while continuing to
represent SSW. Id. at 421, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
24.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2013). Section (a) of this rule states, "While

lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of
Interest: General Rule[;] 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions[;] 1.9 Former
Client[;] or 2.2: Intermediary." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a). Section (b)
states,
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse
to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly
associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6:
Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that
is material to the matter.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b).
25. Hunter,Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 9 & n.12, 730 S.E.2d at 616
& n.12. Consequently, the superior court determined that "any privilege within the firm
was negated by this conflict of interest." St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 420-21,
746 S.E.2d at 103.
26. Hunter,Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 24, 730 S.E.2d at 625.
27. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 421, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
28. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 317 Ga. App. at 13-14, 730 S.E.2d at 619.
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between corporate employees and in-house counsel, but a "bright-line
rule" does not exist for attorneys' communication with the firm's inhouse counsel.29 The absence of a bright-line rule was because this was
the first time "the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to a law
firm's in-house communications concerning a current client" had been
considered in Georgia courts.o The Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari."
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege grants protection over certain communications between attorneys and their clients from disclosure to the
adverse party.32 This is one of the oldest recognized privileges for
Generally, the attorney-client privilege
protecting communication."
(2) made between privileged
"(1)
a
communication[;]
to:
attaches
of obtaining or providing
the
purpose
(4)
for
in
confidence[;]
(3)
persons[;]
34
client."
the
for
assistance
legal
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,as the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context.36 The Court determined that attorney-client privilege protection extends to an attorney's communication with both individual clients
and corporate clients.3 ' The dispute in this case arose from an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) demand for the production of files relating to an
internal investigation conducted by Upjohn Company's general counsel
regarding "questionable payments" made by foreign subsidiaries to
The Supreme Court held that the
foreign government officials."
communications by the corporation's employees to the corporation's in-

A.

29. Id. at 12, 730 S.E.2d at 618.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 13, 730 S.E.2d at 619.
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 419, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).
449 U.S. 383 (1981).

36. Id. at 389-90.
37. Id. ("Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the
client is a corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not an
individual; but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a

corporation. . . .").
38. Id. at 386-88. The files that the IRS demanded were employee responses to a
questionnaire created by the corporation's general counsel and notes from interviews. Id.
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house counsel were protected by the attorney-client privilege.39 The
Court reasoned that there is a public interest in the preservation of the
attorney-client privilege, effectuated by its purpose "to encourage full
and frank communication" within the attorney-client relationship.'
B.

The Attorney-Client Privilege in the State of Georgia
As early as the nineteenth century, Georgia courts have recognized
that certain communication between an attorney and a client should be
protected from disclosure and from being used as evidence against the
party seeking protection over the communication." In Marriott Corp.
v. American Academy of Psychotherapists,Inc.,42 the Georgia Court of
Appeals laid out a five-part test for determining whether a corporate
employee's communication was protected by the attorney-client
privilege." Factors of this "subject matter test" that would make the
attorney-client privilege apply include the following: (1) the purpose of
the communication was to secure legal advice; (2) there was direction by
a corporate superior to make the communication; (3) the request by the
superior was for the purpose of seeking legal advice; (4) the "subject
matter of the communication [was] within the scope of the employee's
...

duties";

and (5) the communication remained confidential."

Additionally, the court of appeals noted that "'[c] ommunications between
client and attorney are excluded from public policy, and are incompetent
as evidence against the client.""'5
In Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Ash," the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed the application of the attorney-client privilege to
communication between an attorney and a corporate client.
The
information sought to be protected by the attorney-client privilege
included the attorneys' correspondence, letters, newsletters, and
directives that were of a "general nature" and included advice to the
client, Southern Guaranty Insurance Company of Georgia.4' The court
of appeals noted that sections 24-9-21, 24-9-24, and 24-9-25 of the

39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 389.
41. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 737, 3 S.E. 420, 422 (1887)
(holding that letters between an attorney and his client were not admissible in court).
42. 157 Ga. App. 497, 277 S.E.2d 785 (1981).
43. Id. at 505, 277 S.E.2d at 791-92.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 503, 277 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210, 140 S.E. 625
(1927)).
46. 192 Ga. App. 24, 383 S.E.2d 579 (1989).
47. Id. at 24, 383 S.E.2d at 580.
48. Id.
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Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)4 9 provided certain
evidentiary privileges that protected the use of communications by an
adverse party.o According to the court of appeals, the burden was
upon the corporation to establish that communication between the
corporation's counsel and the employee was privileged and should be
protected from disclosure under these code sections." Additionally, the
court of appeals determined that the Superior Court of Cherokee County,
Georgia should consider the "totality of the circumstances" when
deciding whether communication warrants protection by the attorneyclient privilege." The court of appeals laid out factors to be considered,
which included the existence of an attorney-client relationship; "the
nature and purpose of the communication;" how the communication was
made; and to whom the communication was made.
The attorney-client privilege in the state of Georgia is now governed
by O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501(a)(2).54 The code sections mentioned in Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. were repealed, and this new statutory
provision for the attorney-client privilege went into effect on January 1,
2013." This statute was amended because the previous three statutes
governing the attorney-client privilege were confusing, and the
legislature felt this newly enacted provision provided a more clear
description of the privilege.56

49. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-21, -24, -25 (2010), repealed by O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501 (2013).
50. S. Guar.Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. at 25, 383 S.E.2d at 581.
51. Id. at 29, 383 S.E.2d at 583.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501(aX2) (2013) ("There are certain admissions and communications
excluded from evidence on grounds of public policy, including, but not limited to ...
[clommunications between attorney and client. . . ."). The work-product doctrine is codified

in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b) (2006); this provision is much like the Federal Rule governing the
work-product doctrine and requires the party seeking "documents and tangible things"
made in preparation of trial by the other party to show a "substantial need" for these
materials and an inability to obtain them without "undue hardship." O.C.G.A. § 9-1126(bX3). Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an attorney is able to
benefit from the protection of the work-product doctrine, which is "designed to balance the
needs ofthe adversary system to promote an attorney's preparation in representing a client
against society's general interest in revealing all true and material facts relevant to the
resolution of a dispute." In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (2013)).
55. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501(a)(2).
56. KENNETH L. SHIGLEY & JOHN D. HADDEN, GEORGIA LAW OF ToRTS-TRIAL
PREPARATION AND PRACTICE § 22:3 (2013).
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C. Attorney-Client Privilege Protectionfor Intra-FirmCommunications
There is a recent line of cases where courts dealt with the attorneyclient privilege in the context of protecting communication between a law
firm's attorneys and its in-house counsel. In Koen Book Distributorsv.
Powell, Trachman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.," the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
addressed whether the attorney-client privilege protected communication
of a lawyer seeking legal advice from another attorney within the firm
regarding a client's threat to sue for legal malpractice." The court
stated that it must determine whether a conflict of interest existed
during the law firm's continued representation of the client before
allowing the application of the attorney-client privilege." Accordingly,
the court held that the communication between the two attorneys was
not protected by the attorney-client privilege because of the conflict of
interest between the law firm and the current client.o
In TattleTale Alarm Systems v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP,61 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied the
plaintiff's motion to compel discovery in a legal malpractice claim.62
The plaintiff demanded that the law firm produce documents related to
its representation of the plaintiff and the payment of maintenance fees
for a patent held by the plaintiff, which was the subject of the dispute." The court pointed to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in its
Additionally, the court used the balancing
analysis of the dispute.
test from Garner v. Wolfinbarger,66 which places the burden on the

57. 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
58. Id. at 284. More specifically, the client seeking disclosure of communications
between the two attorneys informed the law firm that it was considering a legal
malpractice action after it had become dissatisfied with the firm's representation and
continued to retain the services of this law firm for another month before eventual
termination. Id.
59. Id. at 285.
60. Id. at 286.
61. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011).
62. Id. at *1-2.
63. Id.
64. FED. R. EVID. 501.
65. TattleTaleAlarm Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412, at *6 ("That rule provides that
federal common law governs the question of privilege unless '[s] tate law supplies the rule
of decision' on the claim at issue; if that is so, 'the privilege . . . shall be determined in
accordance with [sitate law.'") (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
66. 430 F.2d 1093, 1098, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970). The court balanced the competing
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure and required a showing of good cause on the part
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party requesting discovery to demonstrate good cause for why the
privilege should not apply to the communication.67 Ultimately, the
court declined to create an exception to the privilege under Ohio law and
determined that the plaintiff did not show "good cause" under the
Garnertest to warrant an order compelling discovery.6 8
In Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP," the Illinois Court of Appeals
addressed whether a "fiduciary duty" exception to the attorney-client
privilege applied to communication between a law firm's attorneys and
its in-house counsel.o The issue on appeal arose out of a discovery
dispute stemming from a legal malpractice claim against the defendant
law firm, Seyfarth Shaw LLP (Seyfarth)." Garvy argued that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to the communication Seyfarth
sought to protect because the law firm owed him a fiduciary duty due to
its representation while the firm sought legal advice.7 2 Citing Illinois
case law, the court of appeals noted that "[tihe fiduciary-duty exception
does not .

..

apply to legal advice rendered concerning the personal

liability of the fiduciary or in anticipation of adversarial legal proceedings against the fiduciary."" Additionally, the court of appeals pointed
out that the state of Illinois had not adopted this exception to the
attorney-client privilege and that further analysis of the exception was
not necessary for determining whether the attorney-client privilege
applies to communication between an attorney and the firm's in-house
counsel; however, the court of appeals made it clear that even if the
fiduciary-duty exception were adopted, "it clearly would not apply here
where Seyfarth sought legal advice in connection with Garvy's legal

of the moving party in order to not apply the attorney-client privilege. Id.
67. TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412, at *23.
68. Id. at *29-30.
69. 966 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
70. Id. at 526.
71. Id. The plaintiff, Garvy, hired the defendant, Seyfarth, to assist in the management of a holding company that was owned by the plaintiff, his father, and his four
siblings. After a dispute arose between the owners of this holding company, Garvy was
terminated as president and CEO of the company, and the siblings filed a lawsuit against
the plaintiff and the father. Garvy wished to retain Seyfarth in the chancery litigation, at
which point Seyfarth, at the advice of in-house counsel, informed Garvy of a potential
conflict of interest in Seyfarth's representation of Garvy or his father in the chancery
litigation. Garvy asserted claims of legal malpractice, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty
against Seyfarth and sought production of internal and external communications related
to its representation of Garvy. Id. at 526-30.
72. Id. at 534.
73. Id. at 535.
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malpractice claims against it, and not in its fiduciary capacity as Garvy's
counsel in the chancery litigation.""
IV.

CouRT's RATIONALE

In St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed
the proper standard for the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, concluding that the analysis should be no different in the firm
in-house-counsel context than the analysis for any other attorney-client
relationship. 5
Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege protects
communication when: (1) there is an attorney-client relationship; (2) the
communication relates to the reasons for seeking legal advice; (3) the
communications are confidential; and (4) no exceptions to the privilege
are applicable.7 6
Chief Justice Hunstein wrote the opinion for the Georgia Supreme
Court in its unanimous decision." Justice Hunstein attempted to set
the standard for analyzing whether communication between an attorney
and a firm's in-house counsel is protected under the attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine." She began by noting that the
attorney-client privilege, codified in O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501, is for the
purpose of protecting parties from the "compelled disclosure" of
confidential legal communication." Because this privilege excludes
protected communication from being used by the adverse party, it is
"narrowly construed" by the courts in determining its application.so
Justice Hunstein cited Southern GuarantyInsurance Co. to explain how
Georgia recognizes the attorney-client privilege as protecting communications between a corporation's in-house counsel and the corporation's
management and employees; however, the court had never addressed the

74. Id. at 536.
75. 293 Ga. at 419, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
76. Id. at 423, 746 S.E.2d at 104; see also S. Guar. Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. at 25, 383
S.E.2d at 581; PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE

§

21:2 (2012-2013). Although

the court recognized that some jurisdictions apply a fiduciary-duty exception to the
privilege, it declined to adopt such an exception. St. Simons Waterfront,LLC, 293 Ga. at
427-29, 746 S.E.2d at 107-08; see generally United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
1999); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 284; In re SonicBlue, Inc., 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 181 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008). The court, however, did note that the formality of the
in-house counsel position is relevant in considering "the existence of an attorney-client
relationship." St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
77. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 419, 430, 746 S.E.2d at 102, 109.
78. Id. at 421, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
79. Id. at 421-22, 746 S.E.2d at 103 (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501); see generally MILICH,
supra note 76, at § 21:1.
80. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 422, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
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privilege in the context of communication between a law firm's attorneys
and firm in-house counsel. 8'
Deciding an issue of first impression, Justice Hunstein turned to other
jurisdictions' approaches to determine the application of the privilege in
the internal law-firm setting.82 While some courts do not permit the
privilege's application in this context due to a fiduciary relationship
between the firm and the client," other courts have only limited the
circumstances in which the privilege may apply or apply the privilege
Justice Hunstein declined to adopt any of these
with exceptions.'
Instead, she explained why the application of the
approaches."
attorney-client privilege for communication with firm in-house counsel
in the state of Georgia should be determined no differently than in any
other circumstance in which the privilege may be asserted." Justice
Hunstein described the general rule for when the attorney-client
privilege applies as having four requirements: "(1) there is an attorneyclient relationship; (2) the communications in question relate to the
matters on which legal advice was sought; (3) the communications have
been maintained in confidence; and (4) no exceptions to privilege are
applicable."" She then proceeded to apply each requirement to the
communication between the Hunter Maclean attorneys and the firm's inhouse counsel."
Justice Hunstein stated that the trial court must determine whether
the firm's in-house counsel "was actually acting in that capacity" when
addressing the first prong of the attorney-client privilege test. 9 For an
attorney-client relationship to exist, "[t]he firm should be clearly
established as the client before or in the course of the in-firm communication."9 o She explained that whether a firm constitutes a client for the
purposes of the privilege is a "fact-based determination." Accordingly,
Justice Hunstein listed factors that could be used to decide whether such

81. Id. at 422, 746 S.E.2d at 103-04 (discussing S. Guar.Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. at 24,
383 S.E.2d at 579).
82. Id. at 422-23, 746 S.E.2d at 104.
83. Id.; see generally supra note 54.
84. St. Simons Waterfront,LLC, 293 Ga. at 423, 746 S.E.2d at 104; see generallyGarvy,
966 N.E.2d at 523; TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10412; Thelen Reid &
Priest LLP v. Marland, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17482 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007).
85. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 423, 746 S.E.2d at 104.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 423-24, 746 S.E.2d at 104.
91. Id. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 104-05.
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an attorney-client relationship exists.92 These factors include but are
not limited to: (1) whether there is a distinction between the legal
malpractice claim against the firm and the actual representation of the
client-claimant; (2) separate files for communication and work-product
for the potential malpractice claim against the firm and the actual
representation; and (3) the "level of formality" of the in-house counsel's
position." With respect to these factors, Justice Hunstein explained
that if in-house counsel were involved in representing clients-meaning
they acted as more than just in-house counsel for the firm-it would be
more important to show they maintained a procedural practice to
distinguish their work as in-house counsel from the firm's business.
Justice Hunstein noted that the "assumption" that an attorney within
a firm can represent the firm against a current client is inconsistent
with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit conflicts
of interest." Because of this inconsistency, the court declined to adopt
a standard that considered the Rules of Professional Conduct and
determined that these rules are silent as to this situation and will not
be interpreted to prohibit attorney-client privilege protection. 16
Furthermore, Justice Hunstein cited to the preamble to these rules,
which states that they 'are not intended to govern or affect judicial
application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege."'9
Ultimately, Justice Hunstein concluded that "an imputed conflict of

92. Id. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
93. Id.; see also Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-FirmPrivilege, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1721, 1749 (2005) (noting that separate billing procedures can be used to
distinguish the firm as the client); Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney Client
Privilegefor the Advice of a Law Firm's In-House Counsel, 2000 PROF. LAw SYMP. ISSUES
107, 111 (2000) (distinguishing between "the firm lawyers who are the clients and the firm
lawyers who are the counsel").
94. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
95. Id. at 424-25, 746 S.E.2d at 105. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct impute
the conflicts of individual attorneys to all of the firm's attorneys. GA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R.1.7, 1.10 (2013).
96. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 421, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
97. Id. at 425, 746 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, pmbl., 19)
(2013). Justice Hunstein quoted this preamble further, stating,
[T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's
self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a
disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing
in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or
the extra-disciplinaryconsequences of violating such a duty.
Id. (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, pmbl., 18).
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interest" is no reason for courts to forbid the application of the attorneyclient privilege between a firm's attorneys and its in-house counsel."
Next, Justice Hunstein discussed whether the communications
between the firm's attorneys and the in-house counsel were for the
purpose of obtaining and providing legal advice." She compared the
communication between the attorneys and in-house counsel to that of a
corporation's employees and general counsel.o Similar to the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, Justice Hunstein established that the communication between attorneys and in-house counsel
must be "regarding matters within the scope of the attorneys' employment with the firm" to warrant attorney-client privilege protection. 01
Chief Justice Hunstein then determined whether the communication
was maintained in confidence."o2 Once again, she turned to the
attachment of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context to
0 o Justice Hunstein reasoned that
help her make this determination."
for "intra-firm communications" to be privileged, the communication
regarding the malpractice claims should remain confidential to the firm's
in-house counsel, management, attorneys, and other employees
knowledgeable about the firm's underlying representation."o'
Justice Hunstein next concluded that there was no exception to the
attorney-client privilege that could apply under the circumstances before
As Justice Hunstein recounted, Georgia recognizes only
the court.'
a few exceptions to the attorney-client privilege that would waive the
Although some jurisdictions recognize a fiduciary excepprivilege.'
tion, the opinion made it clear that this exception does not apply to the
0
An adoption of
attorney-client privilege analysis in Georgia courts.f'
the fiduciary exception to the privilege had never been considered in
Justice Hunstein
Georgia appellate courts prior to this case.'
explained that the purpose of the fiduciary exception was so communica-

98. Id. at 425-26, 746 S.E.2d at 106.
99. Id. at 426, 746 S.E.2d at 106.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 426-27, 746 S.E.2d at 106.
102. Id. at 427, 746 S.E.2d at 107.
103. Id. ("The privilege does not attach to communications 'made by lawyers to their
corporate or individual clients (that] are not of a confidential nature.'") (quoting S. Guar.
Ins. Co., 192 Ga. App. at 28, 383 S.E.2d at 583).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ("Georgia law recognizes an exception to the attorney-client privilege for
communications in furtherance of a crime, fraud, or other unlawful end.") (citing MILICH,
supra note 76, at § 21:17).
107. Id. at 427-28, 746 S.E.2d at 107.
108. Id.
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tion between an attorney and trustee that was legal advice that
benefited the trust would not be protected from disclosure to the
beneficiary.109 Furthermore, she pointed to the two rationales used by
other courts for applying this exception in their analysis.no The first
rationale is that "the importance of the trustee's duty to the beneficiaries
trumps the goals served by the attorney-client privilege.""' The other
rationale is that the beneficiary is the attorney's "real client."" 2
Justice Hunstein stated that this real-client rationale does not apply to
She
communication between attorneys and in-house counsel.'
reiterated that there is no mutuality of interest between the current
client potentially bringing a claim and the attorneys seeking advice from
in-house counsel, as there is in the context of the attorney and beneficiary relationship."' Additionally, the court declined to adopt the
"fiduciary duty trumps privilege" notion because the "breach of an
attorney's duty of loyalty is an issue of legal ethics and professional
responsibility collateral to, and not directly bearing on, privilege
law."1
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Attachment of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The use of in-house counsel is becoming a more prevalent practice for
law firms." 6 The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling on this contemporary discovery issue has caught the attention of law firms of all sizes
and with offices outside the state of Georgia."' Many courts have not
addressed the concerns that are common to the attorney-client privilege
Consequently, these
as applied to intra-firm communications."'
jurisdictions do not have a bright-line rule for this attorney-client
A.

109. Id. at 428, 746 S.E.2d at 107.
110. Id.; see generally Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 286; In re SonicBlue, Inc.,
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 181, at *2, *8-9.
111. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 428, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 428, 746 S.E.2d at 107-08.
115. Id. at 428-29, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
116. Curriden, supra note 8, at 22; Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even
Lawyers Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2004), available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/
2004/02/03/business/in-a-complex-world-even-lawyers-need-lawyers.html.
117. Brief for Interested Law Firms in the State of Georgia as Amicus Curiae at 2-3,
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (No. S12G1924).
118. See generally Curriden,supra note 8, at 22.
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relationship and will soon be faced with similar issues." Practitioners believe that the facts of this case make it "an ideal vehicle" for
analyzing the big picture of communications with a firm's in-house
counsel.12 0 Although the court in St. Simons Waterfront, LLC established a rule of analysis, there are still gray areas in determining
whether communications between attorneys and in-house counsel are

protected. 12 1
First, it is unclear from the court's analysis how to determine the
precise moment the attorney-client relationship comes into existence and
the privilege attaches to the communication. 1 22 For example, in St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC, there are disputed facts as to whether SSW
took an adverse position with Hunter Maclean during the conference
call. 1 23 Allowing a law firm to subjectively determine when the client
has become adverse gives the law firm a lot of power in seeking
protection over communication with in-house counsel. Additionally, the
court's ruling could result in an extension of the privilege that the court
may not have intended. It will be interesting to see how law firms use
this opinion to predict whether communication is protected going
forward and how broadly the lower state courts will apply the privilege
to intra-firm communications.
The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling that the fiduciary exception does
not bar protection of communication with a firm's in-house counsel
provides persuasive authority for other states that do not recognize such
an exception to the privilege. 124 For example, the states of California
and Connecticut have not created a fiduciary exception to the attorneyclient privilege.125 For law firms with in-house counsel or that are
contemplating having a member of the staff serve in the position, this
case certainly provides guidance and cautions for law firms to consider.
The court's ruling opens the door for intra-firm communication in
general, encouraging attorneys to seek advice from in-house counsel even
with ethical questions and the handling of a client while enjoying some

119. The reference to the absence of a bright-line rule, or a standard of analysis, in
some jurisdictions for the application of attorney-client privilege is to highlight that there
are courts, outside the ones addressed in the Legal Background section of this Article, that
have not to this date heard a discovery dispute of this nature.
120. Curriden, supra note 8, at 22.
121. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 419-20, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
122. See id. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
123. Id. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
124. Id.
125. See generally Wells Fargo Bank v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 990 P.2d 591,
595 (Cal. 2000); Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 391 (D. Conn. 1986).
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sense of security and confidentiality.1 26 Additionally, the court explicitly stated factors that could be considered in determining whether the
attorney serving as in-house counsel is in fact serving in that role for the
purpose of protected communication;1 27 however, law firms should keep
a watch on Hunter Maclean's success in establishing protection of
communication.128 Although the standard of analysis for the privilege
laid out by the Georgia Supreme Court is favorable to law firms, the
factual determination of whether the attorney serving as in-house
counsel meets the court's definition of in-house counsel will provide law
firms in non-fiduciary-exception states with the facts this determination
turns on.129 As a result, this case will have a direct impact on how law
firms set up the position and how they prepare for legal malpractice
suits.
B. Avoiding Monetary Influences
The idea that a law partner serving as in-house counsel is an equity
partner in the business may present the appearance that the in-house
counsel is never truly separated from the business interest a firm has in
the client. Unlike a corporate in-house counsel who is paid a salary, an
attorney acting as both in-house counsel and partner may receive income
based on an increase in firm business and attorney fees. This issue is
addressed by the court, which ruled that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct should not be considered in the analysis and that there is no
imputation of conflicts to the, in-house counsel.'s If the defendant law
firm in a discovery dispute meets the burden of proving the attorneyclient privilege should apply, which includes a showing of separation and
formality in the position, then the communication is protected, regardless of the lawyer's status in the firm. 1 1 Nevertheless, this analysis
does not consider the in-house counsel's income that may be derived
from the welfare of the firm's business. A possible resolution would be
restructuring the in-house counsel's income to reflect a more strict
salary-based pay rather than benefiting from a percentage of the

126. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
127. Id. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
128. Id. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108. The burden is on Hunter Maclean on remand to
establish that the attorneys' communications with the in-house counsel should be protected
by the attorney-client privilege. Id.
129. Id. at 423-24, 746 S.E.2d at 104-05.
130. Id. at 425-26, 746 S.E.2d at 105-06. Because there is no automatic imputation of
conflict in the Georgia Supreme Court's analysis, law firms are given a chance to prove
separation from the in-house counsel's work in that capacity and the in-house counsel's
work for the client. Id.
131. Id. at 424, 429, 746 S.E.2d at 105, 108.
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business; however, practitioners and partners could respond by
demanding compensation for the inability to represent outside clients
and prosper from the firm's business and clients.1 32
Another solution, as suggested in the factors laid out by the Georgia
Supreme Court, is to have the in-house counsel bill his time separately
13
and to the firm rather than the client.a
Separate billing would
dissuade in-house counsel from making decisions with dollar signs in
mind because there would be no monetary incentive in doing so."
Although there may be concerns that in-house counsel may give advice
to an attorney that ultimately helps the business of the firm, it would be
nearly impossible to draw a distinction between motivation to further
firm business and zealous advocacy. Additionally, just like a partner, inhouse counsel will profit when the firm is prospering and will suffer if
legal malpractice suits result in payments of damages.
C. The Indispensability of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Law
Firms
Plaintiffs' lawyers believe that the standard set by the Georgia
Supreme Court, and even the Georgia Court of Appeals, makes it too
easy for attorneys to seek the protection of the privilege to the detriment
of their clients."' As the attorney for SSW expressed, law firms may
be granted protection over information from disclosure "simply because
the in-house attorney was 'segregated' from directly representing the
client."sA But if courts do not recognize the attorney-client privilege
between a firm's attorneys and their in-house counsel, law firms will be
put at a disadvantage in the event of a legal malpractice claim. The law
firm will be denied privileges and opportunities for confidential
preparation of defenses that are afforded to any other type of defendant
and that are enjoyed by the plaintiff bringing the lawsuit. Recognition
of the attorney-client privilege for communications with in-house counsel
3 ' This
will encourage firms to invest in such a position for their staff."
will in turn increase the level of formality of this attorney-client
relationship within a firm. Regardless of this case's applicability, this

132. See Chambliss, supra note 93, at 1759-60 (discussing a firm's general counsel
remaining a partner at the firm, despite his position as in-house counsel and his separation
from client work, and not being "compensated like a partner"); Glater, supra note 116.
133. See St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 293 Ga. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
134. Glater, supra note 116.
135. See Curriden, supra note 8, at 23.
136. Id.
137. Chambliss, supra note 93, at 1724 (discussing how broad protection of communication would encourage internal investigations and early advice on ethical issues).
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is a win for law firms of all shapes and sizes because it broadens the
attorney-client-privilege protection over internal firm communication.
Attorneys can potentially speak about pending malpractice suits with inhouse counsel with an understanding that the privileged communication
will remain a secret.
NICHOLAS J. GARcIA

Casenote

Suspects Beware: Silence in Response to
Police Questioning Could Prove as Fatal as a
Confession*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution' provides
that "[nlo person shall be .

.

. compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself."' The Fifth Amendment guarantees a right
against government-compelled self-incrimination.' A person may invoke
the right against self-incrimination when he believes he is being forced
by a government official to implicate himself in any crime, and his belief
is reasonable considering his situation.4 If his belief is reasonable, he
is not required to answer the incriminating question, and he cannot be
punished for refusing to answer.5
* The Author would like to thank Professors John 0. Cole, James Fleissner, and
Kamina Pinder for their help in guiding and organizing the Author's thoughts throughout
the writing of this Note.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Id.
3. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013).
4. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
5. See id. at 485-86.
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